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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMON CAUSE, a District of 
Columbia, non-profit corpora-
tion and MARJORIE J. THOMAS, an 
Individual, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
and MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E. 
ZUNDEL and KENNETH RIGTRUP, in 
their capacities as COMMISSIONERS 
of the PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Intervenor and 
Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 15685 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE COMMON CAUSE BRIEF 
This Reply will be directed to those issues as to 
which new matter, citation of authority or argument has 
been raised by COMMON CAUSE in its Brief for the first 
time. The Reply will focus on the following issues: 
1. The attempt of COMMON CAUSE to raise for the 
first time in this appeal the Administrative Rule Haking 
Act as a basis for the jurisdiction of the District Court. 
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2. The claim of COMMON CAUSE that the Administrative 
Rule Making Act excuses it from pursuing its administrative 
remedies. 
3. The claim that Utah case law prohibits the COMMIS-
SION from acting in a quasi-judicial, adjudicatory manner. 
4. The contention that the protection of due process 
does not apply to the COMMISSION. 
5. The argument that MOUNTAIN FUEL's construction of 
the Open and Public Meetings Act requires this Court to 
engage in "judicial law making". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING ACT DOES 
NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
With total disregard for the long standing rule of 
this Court that issues which were not raised before the 
trial court cannot be presented for the first time on 
appeal, !/ COMMON CAUSE suggests in its Brief that the 
jurisdiction of the District Court was predicated upon the 
provisions of the Administrative Rule Making Act, found in 
Title 63, Chapter 46 of the Utah Code. Such argument fails 
as a result of a fatal procedural flaw. The Administra-
tive Rule Making Act was at no time cited to the Court 
lf E.g., DeEry and Hilton Travel Serv., Inc. v. International Airways, 
Inc., (Utah No. 15219 Aug. 10, 1978); American Oil Co. v. The Generai 
Contracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d. 330, 411 P.2d 486 (1966); North Salt 
Lake v. Saint Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 
577 (1950). 
-2-
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below as the jurisdictional basis for the claim, COMMON 
CAUSE having relied exclusively on the provisions of the 
2/ 
Utah Declaratory Judgment Act.- That change in theory 
cannot be raised now for the first time. 
Even the long standing prohibition against raising an 
issue for the first time on appeal aside, however, the 
Administrative Rule Making Act would not have provided 
COMMON CAUSE with a jurisdictional basis had it been 
raised in the Court below. It is apparent from even the 
most casual reading of the Act that it was intended to 
prescribe the procedures to be utilized by public agencies 
in exercising their formal rule making powers. For example, 
notice of intent to adopt a rule must be given and all 
interested parties must be provided an opportunity to 
submit their views.~/ Copies of the rules so adopted are 
to be filed with the State Archivist, who must then com-
pile, index and publish them.!/ Interested persons may 
petition the public agency for amendment or repeal of a 
rule,~/ and the validity or applicability of such a rule 
may be challenged by declaratory judgment action before a 
District Court.~/ The COMMISSION determination of which 
y section 78-33-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1977) 
3/ sections 63-46-4 & 5 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1978) 
iJ Sectlons 63-46-4, 6 & 7 Utah Code Ann .. (Repl. vol. 1978) 
5/ Sections 63-46-8 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1978) 
§_! Section 63-46-9 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1978) 
-3-
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the Appellants now complain, on the other hand, was not 
a rule adopted under this formal procedure but had its 
genesis in quite a different environment. 
The application of the 1977 amendments to the Open 
and Public Meeting Act to the deliberative sessions of the 
COMMISSION following an open adjudicatory hearing first 
arose as a procedural issue during the pendency of several 
general rate cases in the summer of 1977 (including the 
MOUNTAIN FUEL General Rate case, P.S.C. Docket No. 77-057-
03). The COMMISSION requested and obtained on August 15, 
1977 a written legal opinion from the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah advising it that open deliberative 
sessions in the pending matters were not required by the 
Act. (R. 255-60). When the issue was again confronted in 
the MOUNTAIN FUEL-Wexpro Litigation, P.S.C. Docket No. 76-
057-014, the Attorney General reiterated his opinion orally 
before the COMMISSION on September 12, 1977. (R. 69). In 
compliance with the position of the Attorney General, the 
COMMISSION conducted its deliberative sessions in those 
proceedings in the historical fashion. 
When viewed against this procedural backdrop, it is 
clear that the decision of the COMMISSION to continue its 
past practice of holding its deliberative sessions in 
private after a full adversarial hearing was not the 
making of a "rule'' within the meaning of the Administra-
tive Rule Making Act. To the contrary, it was nothing 
-4-
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more than an intermediate procedural ruling made during 
the course of an adjudicatory hearing. It is a long 
established principal of appellate review that such inter-
mediate and interlocutory rulings and orders entered by a 
lower tribunal are not to be attacked piecemeal, but are 
rather merged into and become part of the final decision 
from which the appeal is then taken. 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal 
and Error, §856; Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 
73 P.2d 1277 (1937). There is nothing to suggest that 
these fundamental principles of orderly procedure are any 
less applicable simply because the adversarial and adjudi-
catory hearing was held before an administrative agency 
rather than a Court. 
The Administrative Rule Making Act itself, recognizes 
that such determinations do not come within the definition 
of a rule. In §63-46-3 (4) Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 
1978) "declaratory rulings" are expressly excluded from 
the Act. Section 63-46-10 defines declaratory rulings 
as agency determinations of the "validity or applicability 
of any statutory provision" to their proceedings. Such 
determination has "the same status as agency decisions or 
orders in cases disposed of by the agency after hearing" 
and would not, therefor, be subject to an action for 
declaratory judgment but would be reviewable, in the 
case of COMMISSION rulings, only in accordance with the 
provisions of the Public Utilities Code. 
-5-
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The exclusion of "declaratory rulings" from the 
operation of the Administrative Rule Making Act is entirely 
consistent with prior holdings of this Court narrowing the 
scope of judicial appellate review of administrative in-
terpretation of statutes affecting the agencies procedures. 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d 
781, 784 (1965). 
On the other hand, that policy of limited review would 
be entirely frustrated if the interpretation of the Act 
advanced by COMMON CAUSE were adopted. No longer would 
the decision of the COMMISSION be prima facie correct with 
the scope of review limited to a determination of whether 
the decision of the COMMISSION was in conformity "with the 
general objectives [of] the agency" and was founded upon 
a "rational basis". Rather, under the system of review 
advanced by COMMON CAUSE, the attempt of the District 
Court to second guess the wisdom of the COMMISSION would 
be on appeal, and the decision of the lower court and not 
the COMMISISON would be entitled to the presumption of 
validity. Such a result is out of harmony with the long 
standing public policy of this State and was clearly not 
intended. 
It is apparent that the arguments of COMMON CAUSE 
simply will not withstand critical analysis. At pages 10 
and 11 of its Brief, COMMON CAUSE takes the position that 
-6-
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Section 54-7-16 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1974), which 
grants the exclusive jurisdiction to review orders and 
decisions of the COMMISSION to this Court, is inconsis-
tent with the later provisions of the Administrative Rule 
Making Act and that the exclusive jurisdiction of this 
Court must therefor yield to the jurisdiction of the 
District Court to render a declaratory judgment as 
provided for in the latter statute.2/ This artifically 
created conflict is merely illusory. Decisions and 
orders of the COMMISSION are not covered by the Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act. A declaratory ruling which is 
sought during the course of an administrative hearing is 
to be treated as a decision or order and is, therefore, 
appealable only to this Court. Where is the inconsistency 
or conflict? The question provides its own answer. 
POINT II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING ACT DID NOT 
EXCUSE APPELLANTS FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF 
PURSUING THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
As discussed in Point I hereinabove, the Administra-
tive Rule Making Act has no application to the determina-
tion of the COMMISSION challenged herein. As a result, 
the provisions of §63-46-9 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 
1978) excusing an interested party from seeking a ruling 
from the agency before filing a declaratory judgment 
Section 63-46-2 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1978) expressly pro-
vides that "all other provisions of law, to the extent they are 
inconsistent or in conflict with this Act are repealed and super-
ceded by this Act." 
7 
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action with the District Court, have no application. 
Since the COMMISSION determination on the application 
of the Open and Public Meetings Act must, in fact and law, 
be viewed as a decision or order, it is the administrative 
remedy provision of the Public Utility Code which is 
controlling. The policy enunciated in said Code regarding 
the judicial review of decisions and orders of the COMMIS-
SION is quite clear. There, the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedy through a petition for rehearing is an absolute 
prerequisite to review by this Court. 
Ann. (Repl. vol. 1974). 
POINT III 
§54-7-15 Utah Code 
THE CASE LAW CITED BY COMMON CAUSE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT ITS POSITION THAT THE COMMISSION 
MAY NOT ACT QUASI-JUDICIALLY 
COMMON CAUSE spends a good part of its argument 
creating a straw man over which there is no dispute while 
missing the entire point of this appeal. With great elan 
COMMON CAUSE parades before this Court decisional prece-
dent ranging from 1918 to 1941 in support of the unremark-
able declaration that the COMMISSION, as a creation of the 
legislature, may exercise only such powers as the legisla-
ture has delegated to it. MOUNTAIN FUEL certainly has no 
quarrel with that pronouncement. Neither does MOUNTAIN 
FUEL take exception with the maxim enunciated by these 
cases that as a matter of the Constitutional separation of 
powers, the legislature cannot delegate to the COMMISSION 
-8-
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those powers which belong to the judiciary. These cases 
do not, however, bridge the final chasm which COMMON CAUSE 
attempts to cross. 
Contrary to the inference which COMMON CAUSE tries to 
draw, this Court has never declared that in exercising 
legislatively granted powers the COMMISSION may not pro-
ceed quasi-judicially. COMMON CAUSE misses this critical 
distinction. In summarizing the general case law, one 
commentator has noted that the holding of a quasi-judicial 
proceeding does not make the agency action hjudicial in 
the restrictive constitutional sense" nor does it consti-
tute an invasion of the "judicial powers". 1 Am Jur. 2d, 
Administrative Law, §172. This does not prevent, however, 
said proceeding from being characterized as judicial or 
quasi-judicial for other purposes. The Am Jur citation 
goes on to provide: 
"The presence or absence of the power to 
hear and determine in the sense of a power 
and duty to receive evidence and to exercise 
judgment and discretion in reaching a 
decision on such evidence, especially in 
connection with the presence or absence of 
adverse parties, compulsory attendance and 
examination of witnesses, etc., is an 
important element in determining whether a 
particular act is judicial or quasi-
judicial for procedural and other purposes. 
A quasi-judicial proceeding is com 
plete with notice, hearing, findings, 
order and other requisites such as the 
right to appeal. Thus, a function or 
proceeding may be held judicial in nature 
or quasi-judicial where a hearing is 
required by the constitution or a statute, 
the requirement of a hearing having refer-
ence to the tradition of judicial pro-
ceedings." [Emphasis added.] 
-9-
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Even our legislature, which it must be presumed was 
aware of the prior pronouncements of this Court that the 
Public Service Commission could not exercise the powers 
of the judiciary in the constitutional sense, has recog-
nized that in exercising the functions delegated to it by 
the legislature, the COMMISSION acts in a quasi-judicial 
manner.~/ In Section 13-l-l. 3 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 
1973), the legislature declared that the C0~1ISSION was 
not to be subject to the jurisdiction of the executive 
director of the Department of Business Regulation when 
exercising its "quasi-judicial or rule making functions" 
and that the COMMISSION was to exercise its "quasi-
judicial anj rule making powers" in conformance with the 
provision~ ~f ~n~ Public Utilities Code. 
The straw man of COMMON CAUSE simply misses the 
point. The issue here is not whether the legislatively 
created COMMISSION can exercise only those powers con-
stitutionally delegated to it by the legislature, but 
rather, whether the Open and Public Meetings Act applies 
to the COMMISSION when it sits as a quasi-judicial body 
§! It is a well settled principal of statutory construction that in 
the reenactment, modification or amendment of statutory provisions 
it is presumed that tre legislature has in mind and is aware of 
prior judicial construction of those statutory provisions. 
Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 265, 130 P.2d 278 (1912); Hirath v. 
Pierce, 506 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1973). Therefore, in recognizing 
that the Commission exercises certain "quasi-judicial powers 11 the 
legislature was not referring to the delegation to the Commission 
of powers reserved to the judicial branch of the government in 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, but must have 
been referring to the judicial like procedures engaged in by the 
Commission in the exercise of its legislatively delegated powers. 
-10-
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in the conduct of an adjudicatory and adversarial hear-
ing. As set forth in the opening Brief of MOUNTAIN FUEL, 
answer to that query is clear. The Act has no application. 
POINT IV 
COMMON CAUSE HAS MISAPPREHENDED AND MISAPPLIED 
THE PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
COMMON CAUSE argues at pages 24 and 25 of its Brief 
that the due process arguments of MOUNTAIN FUEL exalt 
form over substance and ignore the fact that the ultimate 
object of the administrative proceeding is a legislative 
act. It is COMMON CAUSE and not MOUNTAIN FUEL, however, 
who disregards the real substance of COMMISSION proceedure. 
Rate making hearings before the COMMISSION are conducted 
in a quasi-judicial setting and the strictures of due pro-
cess are applicable. That issue was finally laid to rest 
in Utility Consumer Action Group v. Public Service Com-
mission, (No. 15049, Aug. 7, 1978) where this Court held 
that denial by the COMMISSION of the right to present 
evidence during a Utah Power & Light rate making pro-
ceeding was an abridgement of due process. 
Virtually acknowledging that it may have overstated 
its case, COMMON CAUSE, goes on to contend Lhat even if 
due process is applicable to an administrative rate 
making proceeding before the COMMISSION, such constitu-
tional mandate does not require closed door deliberative 
-11-
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sessions by the trier of fact. As support for its 
position, COMMON CAUSE cites Christiansen v. Harris, 109 
Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945) as the sine qua non on the 
issue of due process. This case, it is argued, delineates 
each and every element of due process and that unless 
specifically mentioned therein, a procedural defect 
cannot rise to the level of the Constitutional proscrip-
tion. 
It is clear upon closer examination, however, that 
the Christiansen case was not intended nor can it be 
construed as a catalog of each and every element of 
procedural due process. This Court has found a number of 
due process elements which find no place in the Christiansen 
list. For example, in State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 
P.2d 724 (lJ46J, vacated on other grounds, 333 U.S. 95 
(1948), it was held that the failure to render a judgment 
on evidence which is competent, relevant and material, is 
a denial of due process. Similarly, in Alirers vs Turner, 
22 Utah 2d. 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969) the failure of the 
Defendant to obtain effective representation of counsel 
in a criminal case was found to be a denial of due pro-
cess. Again, no mention of that requirement can be found 
in the four corners of the Christiansen opinion. Finally, 
in State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975) this Court 
concluded that the deliberate suppressing of evidence by 
a prosecutor violated due process. 
case is silent on this principle. 
-12-
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Contrary to the attempt of COMMON CAUSE to fix a set 
shopping list of the elements of due process, it is 
apparent that this Constitutional concept must remain 
flexible in its application and reach. The basic element 
of due process is fairness. That concept simply cannot 
be meted out through the application of some artificially 
fixed standard. As noted in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 
420, 440 (1960): 
"Due process is an illusive concept. 
It's exact boundaries are undefinable, 
and 1ts content var1es according to 
specific factual contexts." [Emphasis 
added.] 
As set forth in the opening Brief of MOUNTAIN FUEL, 
the right to a fair and impartial tribunal is foundational 
to the principles of due process. The case law there 
cited by MOUNTAIN FUEL demonstrates that to require the 
trier of fact to conduct its deliberations in the open, 
subject to the external pressures which would necessarily 
follow, so offends the basic requirement of a fair and 
impartial tribunal as to be prohibited by the Constitu-
tional due process mandate. 
As a last gasp COMMON CAUSE attempts to turn the 
argument around by contending that due process does not 
prohibit but rather fosters open deliberations. In so 
arguing, COMMON CAUSE commits the fundamental error of 
confusing the right to an open and fair hearing with the 
right of the trier of fact to conduct its deliberations in 
-13-
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chambers after such an open hearing. If the demand of due 
process were to the contrary, then why not demand that the 
parties be admitted to the jury room to listen to and 
offer comment and instruction upon the jury's considera-
tion of the evidence; or why not subject our trial judges 
to the requirement that they delineate in detail their 
thought processes and deliberations in reaching their 
Findings of Fact in a non-jury case? Such an argument 
must crumble under the weight of its own absurdity. 
Finally, COMMON CAUSE attempts to avoid the impact of 
the prevailing case law by declaring that such decisions~/ 
do not address the constitutional issue of due process in 
holding that the Sunshine Statutes enacted in those juris-
dictions do not apply to private deliberations after a 
quasi-judicial public agency hearing simply ignores the 
facts. Each of those cases expressly adopts the dissent 
in the Canney decision!Q/ so vigorously relied upon by 
COMMON CAUSE. Said dissent directly confronts the issue 
of due process, arguing that the application of an Open 
Meeting statute to such private deliberations would con-
stitute a denial of due process and return us to "the 
~ Jordan v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1976); 
B<;rnstein v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 376 
A.2d 816 (D.C. 1977); DuPont Circle Citizens Assoc. v. District 
of Columbia Bd. of zoning Adjustment, 364 A.2d 610 (D.C. 1976); 
Arizona Press Club v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 Ariz. 
545, 548 P. 2d 697 (1976). 
10/ Canney v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 So.2d 
260 (Fla. 1973). 
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Roman arena for a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down result by the 
public clamor" (278 So.2d 264). 
POINT V 
CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATION OF COMMON CAUSE 
MOUNTAIN FUEL HAS NOT ASKED THIS COURT 
TO ENGAGE IN JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 
COMMON CAUSE argues that in urging this Court to 
recognize that the deliberative sessions of the COMMISSION 
following a quasi-judicial adjudicatory hearing are exempted 
from the Open and Public Meetings Act, MOUNTAIN FUEL is 
seeking the exercise of judicial lawmaking. The basis for 
the exemption of such deliberative sessions from the Act 
is set forth in detail in MOUNTAIN FUEL's opening Brief, 
and that portion of the argument will not be repeated 
herein. It is sufficient to note that the construction of 
the Act advanced by MOUNTAIN FUEL arises from and is 
consistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the 
statute and does not require the judicial lawmaking sug-
gested by COMMON CAUSE. 
Quite to the contrary, it is COMMON CAUSE which falls 
prey to its own argument. Its analysis of the Act is 
conducted in a vacuum without any reference to purpose or 
history. To read the COMMON CAUSE Brief is to reach the 
erroneous conclusion that the concept of open and public 
meetings first broke upon the Utah Legislative scene in 
1977. Its argument simply ignores the fact that Utah had 
an Open and Public Meetings Act on its books for some 22 
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years prior to the convening of the 1977 legislature and 
that the Act upon which COMMON CAUSE now relies was no-
thing more than an amendment and modification to the 
already existing statute. COMMON CAUSE fails to even 
feign a response to the exposition of the legislative 
history, the administrative agency construction of the 
original Act and the intended impact of the 1977 Amend-
ments as set forth in the opening Brief of MOUNTAIN FUEL. 
Such failure is understandable, however, since an examina-
tion of that legislative background strips COMMON CAUSE 
of its argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Declaratory rulings of the COMMISSION pertaining to 
the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to 
COMMISSION proceedings is not a rule and the attempt of 
COMMON CAUSE to belatedly, for the first time on this 
appeal, pin its jurisdictional hopes upon the coat tails 
of the Administrative Rule Making Act will not work. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction, the Brief of COMMON CAUSE falls far short of 
providing the foundational material so necessary to shore 
up the ill advised decision of the Court below. While the 
legislative delegation of authority to the COMMISSION did 
no violence to the doctrine of the separation of powers 
inasmuch as the COMMISSION did not assume the functions of 
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the judiciary, there is no question that in exercising its 
legislatively delegated powers, the COMMISSION acts quasi-
judicially. 
Moreover, it does not require judicial lawmaking to 
exclude the quasi-judicial deliberative sessions of the 
COMMISSION from the coverage of the Open and Public Meet-
ings Act. To the contrary, the clear language of the 
Statute and an examination of its legislative history re-
quire nothing less. 
Finally, the due process mandate of a fair and impar-
tial tribunal is equally at home in the setting of a 
quasi-judicial administrative hearing as it is in the 
courtroom. In fact, there is little difference in the 
procedures employed or the safeguards applied. It is 
fundamental to both that the trier of fact be free from 
external pressure and influence and that the sanctity of 
private deliberations which promote the open and free 
exchange of ideas and the candid examination of the evi-
dence be safeguarded whether the fact finding body be a 
public agency or a jury. These basic principles of fair-
ness cannot be skirted by drawing artificial lines of 
demarcation between a legislatively created quasi-judicial 
body and a court. Neither the Constitution of this State 
nor of the United States make such a distinction in guar-
antying to their citizens the protection of their property 
by due process of law. 
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The sophistry of the COMMON CAUSE argument that the 
legislature may do as it wishes in establishing the 
procedures for the public agencies which it creates must 
not be permitted to blur this Court's focus on the funda-
mental issues of fairness and justice presented by this 
case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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